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This working paper is being distributed to solicit comments, recollections and 
anecdotes from regulators and market participants who worked with VaR or related 
risk measures prior to 1993. Please forward any comments directly to the author. 
Topics of particular interest are: 
• early implementations of VaR or VaR-like measures in trading environments 
during the 1970’s or 1980’s; 
• the extent to which industry practice (existing risk measures used in trading 
environments) influenced the SEC’s Uniform Net Capital Rule, the SFA’s  
1992 capital rule and Europe’s Capital Adequacy Directive; 
• early use (especially during the 1980’s) of names such as “value-at-risk”, 
“capital-at-risk” and “dollars-at-risk”—which name arose first? 
• papers published prior to 1993 that mention or describe VaR measures. During the 1990’s, Value-at-Risk (VaR) was widely adopted for measuring 
market risk in trading portfolios. Its origins can be traced back as far as 
1922 to capital requirements the New York Stock Exchange imposed on 
member firms. VaR also has roots in portfolio theory and a crude VaR 
measure published in 1945. This paper traces this history to 1998, when 




We define VaR as a category of probabilistic measures of market risk. Consider a 
portfolio with fixed holdings. Its current market value is known. Its market value at some 
future time—say one day or one month in the future—is a random variable. As a random 
variable, we may ascribe it a probability distribution. A VaR metric is a function of: 
 
1. that distribution and 
2. the portfolio’s current market value. 
 
With this definition, variance of return, standard deviation of P&L and .95-quantile of 
loss are all VaR metrics. We define a VaR measure as any procedure that, given a VaR 
metric, assigns values for that metric to portfolios. 
 
Early VaR measures developed along two parallel lines. One was portfolio theory, and 
the other was capital adequacy computations. Bernstein (1992) and Markowitz (1999) 
have documented the history of VaR measures in the context of portfolio theory. This 
paper reviews that material only briefly. It focuses primarily upon the development of 
VaR measures in the context of capital adequacy computations.  
  
The Leavens VaR Measure 
The origins of portfolio theory can be traced to non-mathematical discussions of portfolio 
construction. Authors such as Hardy (1923) and Hicks (1935) discussed intuitively the 
merits of diversification. Leavens (1945) offered a quantitative example, which may be 
the first VaR measure ever published.  
 
Leavens considered a portfolio of ten bonds over some horizon. Each bond would either 
mature at the end of the horizon for USD 1,000 or default and be worthless. Events of 
default were assumed independent. Measured in USD 1,000’s, the portfolio’s value at the 
end of the horizon had a binomial distribution. 
 
Writing for a non-technical audience, Leavens did not explicitly identify a VaR metric, 
but he mentioned repeatedly the “spread between probable losses and gains.” He seems to 
have had the standard deviation of portfolio market value in mind. Based upon this 
metric, his portfolio had a VaR of USD 948.69. 
 The Markowitz and Roy VaR Measures 
Markowitz (1952) and, three months later, Roy (1952) independently published VaR 
measures that were surprisingly similar. Each was working to develop a means of 
selecting portfolios that would, in some sense, optimize reward for a given level of risk. 
For this purpose, each proposed VaR measures that incorporated covariances between 
risk factors in order to reflect hedging and diversification effects. While the two measures 
were mathematically similar, they support different VaR metrics. Markowitz used a 
variance of simple return metric. Roy used a metric of shortfall risk that represents an 
upper bound on the probability of the portfolio’s gross return being less than some 
specified “catastrophic return.”  
 
Both Markowitz and Roy skirted the issue of how probabilistic assumptions might be 
specified. Roy’s VaR measure required a mean vector and covariance matrix for risk 
factors. He observed that these must be “estimated from information about the past”. 
Markowitz’s VaR measure required only a covariance matrix for risk factors. He 
proposed that this be constructed using procedures that would be called “Bayesian” 
today: 
 
These procedures, I believe, should combine statistical techniques and the judgment 
of practical men. 
 
In a (1959) book, Markowitz elaborated, dedicating an entire chapter to the construction 
of subjective or “personal” probabilities, as developed by Savage (1954). 
 
Early Innovations 
Markowitz and Roy intended their VaR measures for practical portfolio optimization 
work. Markowitz’s (1959) book is a “how-to” guide to his optimization scheme, boldly 
describing for a non-technical audience computations that would remain infeasible until 
processing power became more available during the 1970’s. Markowitz was aware of this 
problem and proposed a more tractable VaR measure that employed a diagonal 
covariance matrix. William Sharpe described this VaR measure in his Ph.D. thesis and a 
(1963) paper. The measure is different from, but helped motivate Sharpe’s (1964) Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
 
Because of the limited availability of processing power, VaR measures from this period 
were largely theoretical, and were published primarily in the context of the emerging 
portfolio theory. This encompassed the work of Tobin (1958), Treynor (1961), Sharpe 
(1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966). The VaR measures they employed were best 
suited for equity portfolios. There were few alternative asset categories, and applying 
VaR to these would have raised a number of modeling issues. Real estate cannot be 
marked to market with any frequency, making VaR impractical. Applying VaR to either 
debt instruments or futures contracts entails modeling term structures. Also, debt 
instruments raise issues of credit spreads. Futures that were traded at the time were 
primarily for agricultural products, which raise seasonality issues. Schrock (1971) and Dusak (1972) described simple VaR measures for futures portfolios, but neither 
addressed term structure or seasonality issues. 
 
Lietaer (1971) described a practical VaR measure for foreign exchange risk. He wrote 
during the waning days of fixed exchange rates when risk manifested itself as currency 
devaluations. Since World War II, most currencies had devalued at some point; many had 
done so several times. Governments were secretive about planned devaluations, so 
corporations maintained ongoing hedges. Lietaer (1971) proposed a sophisticated 
procedure for optimizing such hedges. It incorporated a VaR measure with a variance of 
market value VaR metric. It assumed devaluations occurred randomly, with the 
conditional magnitude of a devaluation being normally distributed. Computations were 
simplified using a modification of Sharpe’s (1963) model. Lietaer’s work may be the first 
instance of the Monte Carlo method being employed in a VaR measure. 
 
Twenty Years of Change 
The 1970s and 1980s wrought sweeping changes for markets and technology. For VaR, 
these had the combined effect of: 
 
• expanding the universe of assets to which VaR might be applied; 
• changing how organizations took risk; and 
• providing the means to apply VaR in these new contexts. 
 
When the Bretton Woods agreement collapsed in 1971, exchange rates were allowed to 
float, and an active foreign exchange forward market soon emerged. Today, this is the 
largest forward market in the world. 
 
OPEC’s dominance of world oil supplies lead to two oil crises, which sent crude prices 
skyrocketed from USD 2 to USD 35 during the 1970s. Oil markets, which had been the 
province of a handful of global oil companies, were rapidly liberalized to counter the 
state pricing of OPEC. 
 
Shortages of natural gas lead the US Government to pass the 1978 Natural Gas Policy 
Act (NGPA). This started an eleven-year process of deregulation that transformed 
pipeline companies from distributors into transporters and opened the door for 
competition among independent marketing and distribution companies. Later, European 
natural gas markets and world electricity markets would experience similar liberalization. 
 
Floating exchange rates, rampant inflation and monetarist experiments by the US Federal 
Reserve caused USD interest rates to gyrate. At the same time, archaic US regulations 
were incompatible with the high interest rates investors demanded, so the market for 
USD deposits migrated overseas. The US Federal Government embarked on a period of 
staggering budget deficits that lasted through the end of the century. This propelled a 
huge market for US Treasury securities. Disintermediation roiled the banking industry as 
borrowers sought financing directly from securities markets. New markets for US and 
Euro medium-term notes (MTNs) grew rapidly. Investment bank Drexel Burnham popularized the use of high-yield bonds in corporate restructurings. The mortgage pass-
through market grew dramatically and spawned markets for collateralized mortgage 
obligations (CMOs), strips and related instruments. First Boston introduced the first 
asset-backed security (ABS) in 1985, launching a vibrant market for securitized loans, 
leases and revolving debt. 
 
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which had long traded agricultural futures, 
introduced financial futures contracts. First came currency futures in 1972 and then US 
Treasury bill futures in 1975. Over time, futures contracts on bonds, deposits, indexes 
and currencies came to trade on exchanges around the world. 
 
Currency and interest rate swaps were introduced in the early 1980s, starting with a 
currency swap arranged by Solomon Brothers in 1981 between the World Bank and IBM. 
Chase Manhattan Bank introduced the first commodity swap in 1986, and Bankers Trust 
introduced the first equity swap in 1989. 
 
In 1973, Black and Scholes published their groundbreaking option-pricing model. That 
same year, the first registered options exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE), opened for business.  
 
Starting in the early 1980s, a market for over-the-counter (OTC) options gradually 
formed. Dealers experimented with new and “exotic” structures, including swaptions, 
caps, floors, Asian options, barrier options and lookback options. Initially, underliers 
were financial assets such as equities or currencies, but derivatives were soon introduced 
on oil and other commodities. By the close of the decade, volumes were mounting.  
 
Perhaps the greatest consequence of the financial innovations of the 1970s and 1980s was 
the proliferation of leverage. Prior to 1970, avenues for compounding risk were limited. 
With the proliferation of new instruments, opportunities for leverage abounded. Not only 
new instruments, but new forms of transactions also offered leverage. Commodity 
leasing, securities lending, repos and short sales are leveraged transactions. All of these 
either did not exist or had limited use prior to 1970.  
 
Within organizations, leveraging decisions became decentralized. Portfolio managers, 
traders, product managers and even salespeople acquired the tools of leverage. 
Transactions were implemented with a phone call. A single derivatives trader might 
leverage or deleverage his employer a hundred times a day.  
  
As leverage proliferated, trading organizations sought new ways to manage risk taking. In 
turn, this motivated a need for new measures of risk. The traditional risk metrics of 
financial accounting were ineffective, especially when applied to derivatives. Exposure 
metrics such as duration, convexity, delta, gamma, and vega were widely adopted, but 
were primarily of tactical value. Trading organizations started to resemble a Tower of 
Babble, with each trading desk adopting risk metrics suitable for its own transactions. 
Even when two desks adopted similar metrics, there was no means of measuring their 
aggregate risks—you can’t aggregate a crude oil delta with a JPY delta. Organizations increasingly needed a single risk metric that could be applied consistently across asset 
categories.  
 
By 1990, a single processor could easily perform the most complex analyses proposed by 
Markowitz (1959). The age of the mainframe was waning. Personal computers were 
ascendant. Financial firms were embracing technology and were using it for such tasks as 
Monte Carlo pricing of complex derivatives.  
 
Another important development was the rapid growth of a financial data industry. 
Reuters, Telerate, Bloomberg and more specialized firms started compiling databases of 
historical prices. These would provide the raw data needed to specify probabilistic 
assumptions used by VaR measures.   
 
As the 1970s turned to the 1980s, markets were becoming more volatile. Firms were 
becoming more leveraged, and the need for financial risk measures, such as VaR, was 
growing. The resources to implement VaR were becoming available, but VaR remained 
primarily a theoretical tool of portfolio theory. Firms needed some way to measure 
market risk across disparate asset categories, but did not recognized how VaR might fill 
this need. US regulators were laying the groundwork for them to do so. 
 
Origins of Regulatory Capital Requirements 
Prior to 1933, US securities markets were largely self-regulated. As early as 1922, the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) imposed its own capital requirements on member 
firms.
1 Firms were required to hold capital equal to 10% of assets comprising proprietary 
positions and customer receivables.  
 
By 1929, the NYSE capital requirement had developed into a requirement that firms hold 
capital equal to: 
 
• 5% of customer debits; 
• a minimum 10% on proprietary holdings in government of municipal bonds; 
• 30% on proprietary holdings in other liquid securities; and 
• 100% on proprietary holdings in all other securities. 
 
This anticipated today’s capital requirements for securities firms. As we shall see, it 
evolved into the VaR measures that firms use today.  
 
During October 1929, the US stock market crashed, losing 20% of its value.
2 The carnage 
spilled into the US banking industry where banks lost heavily on proprietary stock 
investments. Fearing that banks would be unable to repay money in their accounts, 
depositors staged a “run” on banks. Thousands of US banks failed. 
 
                                                 
1 See Dale (1996), pp. 60-61. 
2 As measured by the Dow Jones Industrial average. The Roaring ‘20s were over, and the Great Depression had begun. During this period, the 
US Congress passed legislation designed to prevent abuses of the securities markets and 
to restore investors’ confidence.  
 
The 1933 Banking Act combined a bill sponsored by Representative Steagall to 
establishing federal deposit insurance with a bill sponsored by Senator Glass to segregate 
the banking and securities industries. It distinguished between: 
 
• commercial banking, which is the business of taking deposits and making loans, and  
• investment banking, which is the business of underwriting and dealing in securities.  
 
All banks were required to select one of the two roles and divest businesses relating to the 
other. Chase National Bank and the National City Bank both dissolved their securities 
businesses. Lehman Brothers dissolved its depository business. The First Bank of Boston 
split off its securities business to form First Boston. JP Morgan elected to be a 
commercial bank, but a number of managers departed to form the investment bank 
Morgan Stanley.  
 
The 1933 Securities Act focused on primary markets, ensuring disclosure of pertinent 
information relating to publicly offered securities. The 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
focused on secondary markets, ensuring that parties who trade securities—exchanges, 
brokers and dealers—act in the best interests of investors. Certain securities—including 
US Treasury and municipal debt—were largely exempt from either act’s provisions. 
 
The Securities Exchange Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
as the primary regulator of US securities markets. In this role, the SEC gained regulatory 
authority over securities firms,
3,4 which include investment banks
 as well as non-banks 
that broker and/or deal non-exempt securities.
5 The 1938 Maloney Act clarified this role, 
providing for self regulating organizations (SRO’s) to provide direct oversight of 
securities firms under the supervision of the SEC. SRO’s came to include the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) as well as national and regional exchanges.  
 
The original Securities Exchange Act imposed a modest capital requirement on securities 
firms. It required firms to not incur aggregate indebtedness in excess of 2,000% of their 
net capital. This requirement limited credit available for stock market speculation, but its 
primary purpose was to ensure that securities firms had sufficient liquidity to meet 
obligations to clients. For this reason, the act excluded non-liquid fixed assets and 
exchange memberships from a firm’s net capital.  
                                                 
3 US law refers to these as broker-dealers. 
4 This authority originally applied only to firms that were members of securities exchanges or who 
transacted business through an exchange member. In 1938, Congress amended the Securities Exchange 
Act, extending the SEC’s authority over all securities firms transacting in non-exempt securities.. 
5 Separate banking regulators oversaw commercial banks. US banks could be chartered by the Federal 
Government or by states. Federally-chartered banks were primarily regulated by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). State-chartered banks were primarily regulated by respective state 
regulatory agencies. In addition, most banks were required to be members of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and most were members of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed).  
In 1938, the Securities Exchange Act was modified to allow the SEC to impose its own 
capital requirements on securities firms, so the SEC started to develop a Net Capital Rule. 
In 1944, the SEC exempted from this capital rule any firm whose SRO imposed more 
comprehensive capital requirements. Capital requirements the NYSE imposed on 
member firms were deemed to meet this criteria. 
 
In 1944, the SEC modified its Net Capital Rule to subtract from net capital 10% of the 
market value of most proprietary securities positions held by a firm. This haircut 
afforded a margin of safety against market losses that might arise during the time it 
would take to liquidate such positions. In 1965, the haircut for equity securities was 
increased to 30%.  
 
The Paperwork Crisis 
Between 1967 and 1970, the NYSE experienced a dramatic increase in trading volumes.  
Securities firms were caught unprepared, lacking the technology and staff to handle the 
increased workload. Back offices were thrown into confusion trying to process trades and 
maintain client records. Errors multiplied, causing losses. For a while, this “paperwork 
crisis” was so severe that the NYSE reduced its trading hours and even closed one day a 
week. In 1969, the stock market fell just as firms were investing heavily in back office 
technology and staff. Trading volumes dropped, and the combined effects of high 
expenses, decreasing revenues and losses on securities inventories proved too much for 
many firms. Twelve firms failed, and another 70 were forced to merge with other firms. 
The NYSE trust fund, which had been established in 1964 to compensate clients of failed 
member firms, was exhausted.  
 
In the aftermath of the paperwork crisis, Congress founded the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (SIPC) to insure client accounts at securities firms. It also 
amended the Securities Exchange Act to require the SEC to implement regulations to 
safeguard client accounts and establish minimum financial responsibility requirements 
for securities firms. 
 
As a backdrop to these actions, it came to light that the NYSE had failed to enforce its 
own capital requirements against certain member firms at the height of the paperwork 
crisis. With its trust fund failing, it is understandable that the NYSE didn’t want to push 
more firms into liquidation. This inaction would mark the end of SROs setting capital 
requirements for US securities firms. 
 
The SEC’s Uniform Net Capital Rule 
In 1975, the SEC updated its capital requirements, implementing a Uniform Net Capital 
Rule (UNCR) that would apply to all securities firms trading non-exempt securities. As 
with earlier capital requirements, the capital rule’s primary purpose was to ensure that 
firms had sufficient liquid assets to meet client obligations. Firms were required to detail their capital calculations in a quarterly Financial and Operational Combined Uniform 
Single (FOCUS) report. 
 
As with the SEC’s earlier capital requirement, haircuts were applied to proprietary 
securities positions as a safeguard against market losses that might arise during the time it 
would take to liquidate such positions. However, the system of haircuts was completely 
redesigned. Financial assets were divided into 12 categories such as government debt, 
corporate debt, convertible securities, preferred stock, etc. Some of these were further 
broken down into subcategories primarily according to maturity. To reflect hedging 
effects, long and short positions were netted within subcategories, but only limited 
netting was permitted within or across categories. An additional haircut was applied to 
any concentrated position in a single asset. 
 
Haircut percentages ranged from 0% for short-term treasuries to, in some cases, 30% for 
equities. Even higher haircuts applied to illiquid securities. The percentages were 
apparently based upon the haircuts banks were applying to securities held as collateral.
6  
 
In 1980, extraordinary volatility in interest rates prompted the SEC to update the haircut 
percentages to reflect the increased risk. This time, the SEC based percentages on a 
statistical analysis of historical security returns. The goal was to establish haircuts 
sufficient to cover, with 95% confidence, the losses that might be incurred during the 
time it would take to liquidate a troubled securities firm—a period the SEC assumed to 
be 30 days.
7 Although it was presented in the archaic terminology of “haircuts”, the 
SEC’s new system was a rudimentary VaR measure. In effect, the SEC was requiring 
securities firms to calculate one-month 95% VaR and hold extra capital equal to the 
indicated value.  
 
US Securities firms became accustomed to preparing FOCUS reports, and started using 
them for internal risk assessments. Soon they were modifying the SEC’s VaR measure 
for internal use. Because they were used for internal purposes, there is limited 
information on the measures customized by specific firms. One interesting document is a 
letter from Stephen C. Francis (1985) of Fischer, Francis, Trees & Watts to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. He indicates that their VaR measure was based upon the 
SEC’s but employed more asset categories, including 27 categories for cash market US 
Treasuries alone. He notes:  
 
We find no difficulty utilizing on an essentially manual basis the larger number of 
categories, and indeed believe it necessary to capturing accurately our gross and 
net risk exposures.  
 
Over time, securities firms found a variety of uses for these proprietary VaR measures. 
An obvious use was to provide a measure of a firm’s overall market risk on an ongoing 
basis. Related applications were to calculate internal capital requirements and to support 
market risk limits.  
                                                 
6 See Dale (1996), p. 78. 
7 See Securities and Exchange Commission (1980) and Dale (1996), pp. 78, 80.  
Garbade’s VaR Measures 
During the 1980’s, Kenneth Garbade worked in the Bankers Trust Cross Markets 
Research Group developing sophisticated modeling techniques for the US debt market. 
As part of the firm’s marketing efforts, he prepared various research reports for 
distribution to institutional clients. Two of these, Garbade (1986, 1987), described 
sophisticated VaR measures for assessing internal capital requirements.
8 Garbade (1986) 
noted: 
 
In view of the importance of risk assessment and capital adequacy to regulatory 
agencies and market participants, it is not surprising that many analysts have tried to 
devise procedures for computing risk and/or capital adequacy which are (a) 
comprehensive and (b) simple to implement. Without exception, however, those who 
make the effort quickly discover that the twin goals of breadth and simplicity are 
seemingly impossible to attain simultaneously. As a result, risk and capital adequacy 
formulas are either complex or of limited applicability, and are sometimes both. 
 
Garbade’s (1986) VaR measures modeled each bond based upon its price sensitivity to 
changes in yield—its “value of a basis point.” Portfolio market values were assumed 
normally distributed. Given a covariance matrix for yields at various maturities, the 
standard deviation of portfolio value was determined. With this characterization, VaR 
metrics—including standard deviation of loss and .99-quantile of loss—were calculated. 
Principal component analysis was used to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. 
 
Garbade (1987) extended this work. He introduced a bucketing scheme that allowed him 
to remap a large portfolio of bonds as a smaller portfolio of representative bonds. He 
introduced a technique to disaggregate a portfolio’s risk and allocate it among multiple 
profit centers.  
 
Garbade’s papers attracted little attention. They were circulated only to institutional 
clients of Bankers Trust. For prospective buy-side users of VaR, they were years ahead of 
their time. For Garbade, they were just an application of the theoretical research he was 
performing with other members of the Cross Markets Research Group. He did not include 
them in his (1996) edited collection of the papers he wrote while with the group. 
 
The 1988 Basle Accord 
On June 26, 1974, German regulators forced the troubled Bank Herstatt into liquidation. 
That day, a number of banks had released payment of DEM to Herstatt in Frankfurt in 
exchange for USD that was to be delivered in New York. Because of time-zone 
differences, Herstatt ceased operations between the times of the respective payments. The 
counterparty banks did not receive their USD payments. 
                                                 
8 I am indebted to Craig Dibble, formerly of Bankers Trust, for bringing Garbade’s 1986 paper to my 
attention.  
Responding to the cross-jurisdictional implications of the Herstatt debacle, the G-10
9 
countries formed a standing committee under the auspices of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS).
10 Called the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the committee 
comprises representatives from central banks and regulatory authorities. Over time, the 
focus of the committee has evolved, embracing initiatives designed to: 
 
• define roles of regulators in cross-jurisdictional situations; 
• ensure that international banks or bank holding companies do not escape 
comprehensive supervision by some “home” regulatory authority; 
• promote uniform capital requirements so banks from different countries may compete 
with one another on a “level playing field.” 
 
While the Basle Committee’s recommendations lack force of law, G-10 countries are 
implicitly bound to implement its recommendations as national laws. 
 
In 1988, the Basle Committee published a set of minimal capital requirements for banks. 
These were adopted by the G-10 countries, and have come to be known as the 1988 Basle 
Accord. We have already discussed the SEC’s UNCR. The 1988 Basle Accord differed 
from this in two fundamental respects: 
 
• It was international, whereas the UNCR applied only to US firms; 
• It applied to banks whereas the UNCR applied to securities firms. 
 
Historically, minimum capital requirements have served fundamentally different 
purposes for banks and securities firms.  
 
Banks were primarily exposed to credit risk. They held illiquid portfolios of loans 
supported by deposits. Loans could be liquidated rapidly only at “fire sale” prices. This 
placed banks at risk of “runs.” If depositors feared a bank might fail, they would 
withdraw their deposits. Forced to liquidate its loan portfolio, the bank would succumb to 
staggering losses on those sales.  
 
Deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort provisions eliminated the risk of bank runs, 
but they introduced a new problem. Depositors no longer had an incentive to consider a 
bank’s financial viability before depositing funds. Without such marketplace discipline, 
regulators were forced to intervene. One solution was to impose minimum capital 
requirements on banks. Because of the high cost of liquidating a bank, such requirements 
were generally based upon the value of a bank as a going concern. 
                                                 
9 The G-10 is actually eleven countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Luxembourg is also represented on the 
Basle Committee. 
10 The BIS is an international organization which fosters international monetary and financial cooperation 
and serves as a bank for central banks. It was originally formed by the Hague Agreements of 20 January 
1930, which had a primary purpose of facilitating Germany’s payment of reparations following World War 
I. Today, the BIS is a focal point for research and cooperation in international banking regulation.  
The primary purpose of capital requirements for securities firms was to protect clients 
who might have funds or securities on deposit with a firm. Securities firms were 
primarily exposed to market risk. They held liquid portfolios of marketable securities 
supported by secured financing such as repos. A troubled firm’s portfolio could be 
unwound quickly at market prices. For this reason, capital requirements were based upon 
the liquidation value of a firm.  
 
In a nutshell, banks entailed systemic risk. Securities firms did not. Regulators would 
strive to keep a troubled bank operating. They would gladly unwind a troubled securities 
firm. Banks needed long-term capital in the form of equity or long-term subordinated 
debt. Securities firms could operate with more transient capital, including short-term 
subordinated debt. The 1988 Basle accord focused upon a bank’s viability as a going 
concern. It set minimum requirements for long-term capital based upon a formulaic 
assessment of a bank’s credit risks. It did not specifically address market risk. The SEC’s 
UNCR focused on a securities firm’s liquid capital with haircuts for market risk. 
  
Because banks and securities firms are so different, it is appropriate to apply separate 
minimum capital requirements to each. This was feasible in the United States and Japan, 
which both maintained a statutory separation of banking and securities activities. 
 
The United Kingdom’s “Big Bang” 
The United Kingdom enforced no statutory separation of banking and securities 
industries, but distinguished between them as a matter of custom. The Bank of England 
supervised banks. Securities markets were traditionally self-regulating, but the sweeping 
1986 Financial Services Act—informally called the “Big Bang”—changed this. It 
established the Securities and Investment Board (SIB) to regulate securities markets. The 
SIB delegated much of its authority to SROs, granting responsibility for wholesale 
securities markets primarily to the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA). If a British 
firm engaged in both banking and securities activities, both the Bank of England and the 
SFA would provide oversight, with one playing the role of “lead regulator.” 
 
In 1992, the SFA adopted financial rules for securities firms, which included capital 
requirements for credit and market risks. These specified a crude VaR measure for 
determining market risk capital requirements for equity, fixed income, foreign exchange 
and commodities positions. 
 
By the 1990’s, concepts from portfolio theory were widely used by institutional equity 
investors. London had traditionally emphasized equity financing to a greater extent than 
other financial centers,
11 and this emphasis appears to have influenced the SFA in 
designing its VaR measure. While crude from a theorist’s standpoint, the measure 
incorporated concepts from portfolio theory, including the CAPM distinction between 
systematic and specific risk. The measure did not employ covariances, but summing risks 
                                                 
11 See Scott-Quinn (1994). under square root signs and applying various scaling factors seems to have accomplish an 
analogous purpose. Because of its pedigree, the SFA’s VaR measure came to be called 
the “portfolio approach” to calculating capital requirement. As fate would have it, the 
SFA’s initiative would soon be overtaken by events within the European Union. 
 
Europe’s Capital Adequacy Directive  
Germany had a tradition of universal banking, which made no distinction between 
banks and securities firms. Under German law, securities firms were banks, and a single 
regulatory authority oversaw banks. France and the Scandinavian countries had similar 
regimes. Accordingly, Europe supported two alternative models for financial regulation: 
 
• the Continental, or German model of universal banking, and 
• the Anglo-Saxon, or British model of generally separate banking and securities 
activities.  
 
The European Union (EU) had a goal of implementing a common market by 1993. As the 
nations of Europe moved towards integrating their economies, the two models of 
financial regulation came into conflict. New EU laws needed either to choose between or 
somehow blend the two approaches. 
 
The issue was settled by the 1989 Second Banking Coordination Directive and the 1993 
Investment Services Directive. These granted European nations broad latitude in 
establishing their own legal and regulatory framework for financial services. Financial 
firms were granted a “single passport” to operate throughout the EU subject to the 
regulations of their home country. A bank domiciled in an EU country that permitted 
universal banking could conduct universal banking in another EU country that prohibited 
it. With France and Germany committed to universal banking, the single passport model 
effectively opened all of Europe to universal banking. It also permitted Britain to 
maintain a separate regulatory framework for its non-bank securities firms. 
 
Since the securities operations of Germany’s universal banks would be competing with 
Britain’s non-bank securities firms, there was a desire to harmonize capital requirements 
for the two. The solution implemented with the 1993 Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD) 
was to regulate functions instead of institutions.  
 
The CAD established uniform capital standards applicable to both universal banks’ 
securities operations and non-bank securities firms. A universal bank would identify a 
portion of its balance sheet as comprising a “trading book”. Capital for the trading book 
would be held in accordance with the CAD while capital for the remainder of the bank’s 
balance sheet would be held in accordance with the 1988 Basle Accord, as implemented 
by Europe’s 1989 Solvency Ratio Directive.
12 Bank capital was conservatively defined 
                                                 
12 The CAD and 1988 Basle Accord only set minimum requirements. National authorities were free to set 
higher requirements. according to the 1989 Own Funds Directive, but local regulators had discretion to apply 
more liberal rules for capital supporting the trading book. 
 
A bank’s “trading book” would include equities and fixed income securities held for 
dealing or proprietary trading. It would also include equity and fixed income OTC 
derivatives, repos, certain forms of securities lending and exposures due to unsettled 
transactions. Foreign exchange exposures were not included in the trading book, but were 
addressed organization-wide under a separate provision of the CAD. 
 
A minimum capital requirement for the market risk of a trading book was based upon a 
crude VaR measure intended to loosely reflect a 10-day 95% VaR metric.
13 This entailed 
separate “general risk” and “specific risk” computations, with the results summed. The 
measure has come to be known as the “building-block” approach. 
 
General risk represented risk from broad market moves. Positions were divided into 
categories, one for equities and 13 for various maturities of fixed income instruments. 
Market values
14 were multiplied by category-specific risk weights—8% for equities and 
maturity-specific percentages for fixed income instruments. Weighted positions were 
netted within categories, and limited netting was permitted across fixed income 
categories. Results were summed. 
 
Specific risk represented risk associated with individual instruments. Positions were 
divided into four categories, one for equities and three covering central government, 
“qualifying” and “other” fixed income instruments. Risk weights were: 
 
• 2% for equities, 
• 0% for central government instruments, 
• 0.25%, 1% or 1.6% for qualifying instruments, depending upon maturity, and 
• 8% for other instruments. 
 
Results were summed without netting, either within or across categories.  
 
By netting positions in its general risk calculation, the CAD recognized hedging effects to 
a greater extent than the SEC’s UNCR. Like the UNCR, it recognizes no diversification 
benefits. In this regard, both the CAD and UNCR were less sophisticated than the SFA’s 
portfolio approach. 
 
Weakening of Glass-Steagall 
Across the Atlantic, the United States was embracing—albeit gradually—aspects of 
universal banking. The history of the Glass-Steagall act is one of incremental weakening 
of its separation between the banking and securities industries. Some of this stemmed 
                                                 
13 See Dale, p. 42. 
14 Derivatives were included in both the general and specific risk calculation based upon their delta-
equivalent values. from regulatory actions. Much of it stemmed from market developments not anticipated 
by the act. 
 
The original Glass-Steagall Act permitted banks to deal in exempt securities. Banks were 
also permitted to engage in limited brokerage activities as a convenience to clients who 
used the bank’s other services. Over time, that authorization was expanded.  
 
Glass-Steagall did not prevent commercial banks from engaging in securities activities 
overseas. By the mid 1980s, US commercial banks such as Chase Manhatten, Citicorp 
and JP Morgan had thriving overseas securities operations. During the late 1980s, banks 
were also permitted to engage in limited domestic activities in non-exempt securities 
through so called “Section 20” subsidiaries.
15  
 
Currencies were not securities under the Glass-Steagall Act, but when exchange rates 
were allowed to float in the early 1970s, they entailed similar market risk. In 1933, 
futures markets were small and transacted primarily in agricultural products, so they were 
excluded from the act’s definition of securities. Also, the Glass-Steagall Act did not 
anticipate the emergence of active OTC derivatives markets, so most derivatives did not 
fall under its definition of securities. By 1993, US commercial banks were taking 
significant market risks, actively trading foreign exchange, financial futures and OTC 
derivatives. 
 
The Basle-IOSCO Initiative 
With banks increasingly taking market risk, in the early 1990s, the Basle Committee 
decided to update its 1988 accord to include bank capital requirements for market risk. 
This would have implications for non-bank securities firms.  
 
As indicated earlier, capital requirements for banks and securities firms served different 
purposes. Bank capital requirements had existed to address systemic risks of banking. 
Securities capital requirements had originally existed to protect clients who left funds or 
securities on deposit with a securities firm. Regulations requiring segregation of investor 
assets as well as account insurance had largely addressed this risk. Increasingly, capital 
requirements for securities firms were being justified on two new grounds: 
 
1. Although securities firms did not pose the same systemic risks as banks, it was argued 
that bank securities operations and non-bank securities firms should face the same 
capital requirements. Such “harmonization” would create a competitive “level playing 
field” between the two. This was the philosophy underlying Europe’s CAD. 
 
                                                 
15 Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act forbade banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System from 
affiliating with any company engaged principally in underwriting or distributing non-exempt securities. In 
April 1987, the Fed interpreted this provision as permitting member banks to affiliate with companies 
engaged in limited securities activities. This interpretation was upheld by US courts, and commercial banks 
started forming “Section 20” affiliates. 2. Some securities firms were active in the OTC derivatives markets. Unlike traditional 
securities, many OTC derivatives were illiquid and posed significant credit risk for 
one or both counterparties. This was compounded by their high leverage that could 
inflict staggering market losses on unwary firms. Fears were mounting that the failure 
of one derivatives dealer could cause credit losses at other dealers. For the first time, 
non-bank securities firms were posing systemic risks.  
 
Any capital requirements the Basle Committee adopted for banks’ market risk would be 
incorporated into future updates of Europe’s CAD and thereby apply to Britain’s non-
bank securities firms. If the same framework were extended to non-bank securities firms 
outside Europe, then market risk capital requirements for banks and securities firms 
would be harmonized globally. In 1991, the Basle Committee entered discussions with 
the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO)
16 to jointly develop 
such a framework.  
 
The two organizations formed a technical committee, and work commenced in January 
1992. At that time, European regulators were completing work on the CAD, and many 
wanted the Basle-IOSCO initiative to adopt a similar building-block VaR measure. US 
regulators were hesitant to abandon the VaR measure of the UNCR, which has come to 




Of the three VaR measures, the portfolio approach was theoretically most sophisticated, 
followed by the building-block approach and finally the comprehensive approach. The 
technical committee soon rejected the portfolio approach as too complicated. Lead by 




Richard Breeden was chairman of the SEC and chairman of the technical committee. 
Ultimately, he balked at discarding the SEC’s comprehensive approach. An analysis by 
the SEC indicated that the building block measure might reduce capital requirements for 
US securities firms by 70% or more. Permitting such a reduction, simply to harmonize 
banking and securities regulations, seemed imprudent. The Basle-IOSCO initiative had 
failed. In the United States, banking and securities capital requirements were to remain 
distinct. 
 
Wilson’s VaR Measure 
By 1993, a fair number of financial firms were employing proprietary VaR measures to 
assess market risk, allocate capital or monitor market risk limits. The measures took 
various forms. The most common approach generally followed Markowitz (1952, 1959). 
A portfolio’s value would be modeled as a linear polynomial of certain risk factors. A 
                                                 
16 IOSCO was founded in 1974 to promote the development of Latin American securities markets. In 1983, 
its focus was expanded to encompass securities markets around the world.  
17 See Shirreff (1992) for a discussion of the competing issues faced by the technical committee. 
18 See Dimson and Marsh (1995) for a comparison of the three regulatory VaR measures. covariance matrix would be constructed for the risk factors, and from this, the standard 
deviation of portfolio value would be calculated. If portfolio value were assumed normal, 
a quantile of loss could be calculated. 
 
Thomas Wilson was working as a project manager for McKinsey & Co. He published 
(1993) a sophisticated VaR measure, noting:
19 
 
… This article aims to develop a method of incorporating stochastic covariance 
matrices into risk capital calculations using simple assumptions. In the most 
straightforward case, the adjustment to standard risk capital calculations is as simple 
as replacing the usual normal distribution with the standard t-distribution. The t-
distribution has “fatter tails” than the normal distribution, reflecting the fact that the 
covariance matrix is also a random variable about which the risk manager has only 
limited prior information.  
 
Wilson’s paper represents the first published attempt to reflect leptokurtosis and 
heteroskedasticity in the practical VaR measures used on trading floors. It is also the first 
detailed description of a VaR measure for use in a trading environment since Garbade’s 
(1987) paper. The author’s casual assumption that readers are familiar with the use of 
VaR measures on trading floors is indicative of how widespread such use had already 
become. 
 
Without acknowledging his doing so, Wilson also touched on a philosophical issue of 
some practical importance. He suggested that the covariance matrix for risk factors 
actually exists, but that a user may have limited knowledge as to its values. This objective 
interpretation of the underlying probabilities runs counter to Markowitz’s (1952, 1959) 
subjective approach, which suggests that the covariance matrix does not actually exist, 
but is constructed by the user to reflect his own perceptions. 
 
G-30 Report 
In 1990, risk management was novel. Many financial firms lacked an independent risk 
management function. This concept was practically unheard of in non-financial firms. As 
unease about derivatives and leverage spread, this started to change. 
  
The term “risk management” was not new. It had long been used to describe techniques 
for addressing property and casualty contingencies. Doherty (2000) traces such usage to 
the 1960s and 1970s when organizations were exploring alternatives to insurance, 
including: 
 
• risk reduction through safety, quality control and hazard education, and 
• alternative risk financing, including self-insurance and captive insurance. 
                                                 
19 Wilson refers to Europe’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). In anticipation of unifying their currencies, 
European countries agreed to intervene in markets to maintain exchange rates between their respective 
currencies within certain trading “bands.”   
Such techniques, together with traditional insurance, were collectively referred to as risk 
management.  
 
More recently, derivative dealers were promoting “risk management” as the use of 
derivatives to hedge or customize market-risk exposures. For this reason, derivative 
instruments were sometimes called “risk management products.”  
 
The new “risk management” that evolved during the 1990’s is different from either of the 
earlier forms. It tends to view derivatives as a problem as much as a solution. It focuses 
on reporting, oversight and segregation of duties within organizations. Such concepts 
have always been important. In the early 1990’s they took on a new urgency.  
 
On January 30, 1992, Gerald Corrigan addressed the New York Bankers Association over 
lunch during their mid-Winter meeting at New York’s Waldorf Hotel. He had just flown 
from Geneva where, in his capacity as chairman of the Basle Committee, he had just 
launched the ill-fated Basle-IOSCO initiative. Now he was speaking in his other capacity 




… the interest rate swap market now totals several trillion dollars. Given the sheer 
size of the market, I have to ask myself how it is possible that so many holders of 
fixed or variable rate obligations want to shift those obligations from one form to 
the other. Since I have a great deal of difficulty in answering that question, I then 
have to ask myself whether some of the specific purposes for which swaps are 
now being used may be quite at odds with an appropriately conservative view of 
the purpose of a swap, thereby introducing new elements of risk or distortion into 
the marketplace—including possible distortions to the balance sheets and income 
statements of financial and nonfinancial institutions alike. 
 
I hope this sounds like a warning, because it is. Off-balance sheet activities have a 
role, but they must be managed and controlled carefully, and they must be 
understood by top management as well as by traders and rocket scientists. 
 
That summer, Paul Volker, chairman of the Group of 30,
21 approached Dennis 
Weatherstone, chairman of JP Morgan, and asked him to lead a study of derivatives 
industry practices. Weatherstone formed an international steering committee and a 
working group of senior managers from derivatives dealers, end users and related legal, 
accounting and academic disciplined. They produced a 68-page report, which the Group 
of 30 published in July 1993. Entitled Derivatives: Practices and Principles, it has come 
to be known as the G-30 Report. It describes then-current derivatives use by dealers and 
                                                 
20 This incident is documented in Shirreff (1992). See Corrigan (1992) for a full text of the speech. 
21 Founded in 1978, the Group of 30 is a non-profit organization of senior executives, regulators and 
academics. Through meetings and publications, it seeks to deepen understanding of international economic 
and financial issues. end-users. The heart of the study was a set of 20 recommendations to help dealers and 
end-users manage their derivatives activities. Topics included:  
 
• the role of boards and senior management,  
• the implementation of independent risk management functions,  
• the various risks that derivatives transactions entail.  
 
With regard to the market risk faced by derivatives dealers, the report recommended that 
portfolios be marked-to-market daily, and that risk be assessed with both VaR and stress 
testing. It recommended that end-users of derivatives adopt similar practices as 
appropriate for their own needs. 
 
While the G-30 Report focused on derivatives, most of its recommendations were 
applicable to the risks associated with other traded instruments. For this reason, the report 
largely came to define the new risk management of the 1990’s. The report is also 
interesting, as it may be the first published document to use the word “value-at-risk.” 
 
Organizational Mishaps 
By the 1990’s, the dangerous affects of derivatives and leverage were taking a toll on 
corporations. In February 1993, Japan’s Showa Shell Sekiyu oil company, reported a 
USD 1,050MM loss from speculating on exchange rates. In December of that same year, 
MG Refining and Marketing, a US subsidiary of Germany’s Metallgesellschaft AG, 
reported a loss of USD 1,300MM from failed hedging of long-dated oil supply 
commitments.  
 
The popular media noted these staggering losses, and soon focused attention on other 
organizational mishaps. In 1994, there was a litany of losses. China’s state sponsored 
CITIC conglomerate and Chile’s state-owned Codelco copper corporation lost USD 
40MM and USD 207MM trading metals on the London Metals Exchange (LME). US 
companies Gibson Greetings, Mead, Proctor & Gamble and Air Products and Chemicals 
all reported losses from differential swaps transacted with Bankers Trust. Japan’s 
Kashima Oil lost USD 1,500MM speculating on exchange rates. California’s Orange 
County announced losses from repos and other transactions that would total USD 
1,700MM. These are just a few of the losses publicized during 1994. 
 
The litany continued into 1995. A notable example is Japan’s Daiwa Bank. One of its 
US-based bond traders had secretly accumulated losses of USD 1,100MM over a 10 year 
period. What grabbed the world’s attention, though, was the dramatic failure of Britain’s 
Barings PLC in February 1995. Nick Leeson, a young trader based at its Singapore 
office, lost USD 1,400MM from unauthorized Nikki futures and options positions. 
Barings had been founded in 1762. It had financed Britain’s participation in the 
Napoleonic wars. It had financed America’s Louisiana purchase and construction of the 
Erie Canal. Following its collapse, Barings was sold to Dutch bank ING for the price of 
one British pound. 
 RiskMetrics 
During the late 1980’s, JP Morgan developed a firm-wide VaR system.
22 This modeled 
several hundred risk factors. A covariance matrix was updated quarterly from historical 
data. Each day, trading units would report by e-mail their positions’ deltas with respect to 
each of the risk factors. These were aggregated to express the combined portfolio’s value 
as a linear polynomial of the risk factors. From this, the standard deviation of portfolio 
value was calculated. Various VaR metrics were employed. One of these was one-day 
95% USD VaR, which was calculated using an assumption that the portfolio’s value was 
normally distributed. 
 
With this VaR measure, JP Morgan replaced a cumbersome system of notional market 
risk limits with a simple system of VaR limits. Starting in 1990, VaR numbers were 
combined with P&L’s in a report for each day’s 4:15 PM Treasury meeting in New York. 
Those reports, with comments from the Treasury group, were forwarded to Chairman 
Weatherstone. 
 
One of the architects of the new VaR measure was Till Guldimann. His career with JP 
Morgan had positioned him to help develop and then promote the VaR measure within 
the firm. During the mid 1980’s, he was responsible for the firm’s asset/liability analysis. 
Working with other professionals, he developed concepts that would be used in the VaR 
measure. Later as chairman of the firm’s market risk committee, he promoted the VaR 
measure internally. As fate would have it, Guldimann’s next position placed him in a role 
to promote the VaR measure outside the firm. 
 
In 1990 Guldimann took responsibility for Global Research, overseeing research 
activities to support marketing to institutional clients. In that capacity he managed an 
annual research conference for clients. In 1993, risk management was the conference 
theme. Guldimann gave the keynote address and arranged for a demonstration of JP 
Morgan’s VaR system. The demonstration generated considerable interest. Clients asked 
if they might purchase or lease the system. Since JP Morgan was not a software vendor, 
they were disinclined to comply. Guldimann proposed an alternative. The firm would 
provide clients with the means to implement their own systems. JP Morgan would 
publish a methodology, distribute the necessary covariance matrix and encourage 
software vendors to develop compatible software.  
 
Guldimann formed a small team to develop something for the next year’s research 
conference. The service they developed was called RiskMetrics. It comprised a detailed 
technical document as well as a covariance matrix for several hundred key factors, which 
was updated daily. Both were distributed without charge over the Internet. The service 
was rolled out with considerable fanfare in October 1994. A public relations firm placed 
ads and articles in the financial press. Representatives of JP Morgan went on a multi-city 
tour to promote the service. Software vendors, who had received advance notice, started 
promoting compatible software. Launched at a time of global concerns about derivatives 
and leverage, the timing for RiskMetrics was perfect. 
                                                 
22 See Guldimann (2000).  
RiskMetrics was not a technical breakthrough. While the RiskMetrics Technical 
Document contained original ideas, for the most part, it described practices that were 
already widely used. Its linear VaR measure was arguably less sophisticated than those of 
Garbade (1986) or Wilson (1993). The important contribution of RiskMetrics was that it 
publicized VaR to a wide audience. 
 
Regulatory Approval of Proprietary VaR Measures 
In April 1993, following the failure of its joint initiative with IOSCO, the Basle 
committee released a package of proposed amendments to the 1988 accord. This included 
a document proposing minimum capital requirements for banks’ market risk. The 
proposal generally conformed to Europe’s CAD. Banks would be required to identify a 
trading book and hold capital for trading book market risks and organization-wide foreign 
exchange exposures. Capital charges for the trading book would be based upon a 
building-block VaR measure loosely consistent with a 10-day 95% VaR metric. Like the 
CAD measure, this partially recognized hedging effects but ignored diversification 
effects. 
 
The committee received numerous comments on the proposal. Commentators perceived 
the building-block VaR measure as a step backwards. Many banks were already using 
proprietary VaR measures.
23 Most of these modeled diversification effects, and some 
recognized portfolio non-linearities. Commentators wondered if, by embracing a crude 
VaR measure, regulators might stifle innovation in risk measurement technology. 
 
In April 1995, the committee released a revised proposal. This made a number of 
changes, including the extension of market risk capital requirements to cover 
organization-wide commodities exposures. An important provision allowed banks to use 
either a regulatory building-block VaR measure or their own proprietary VaR measure 
for computing capital requirements. Use of an proprietary measure required approval of 
regulators. A bank would have to have an independent risk management function and 
satisfy regulators that it was following acceptable risk management practices. Regulators 
would also need to be satisfied that the proprietary VaR measure was sound. Proprietary 
measures would need to support a 10-day 99% VaR metric and be able to address the 
non-linear exposures of options. Diversification effects could be recognized within broad 
asset categories—fixed income, equity, foreign exchange and commodities—but not 
across asset categories. Market risk capital requirements were set equal to the greater of: 
 
• the previous day’s VaR, or 
• the average VaR over the previous six days, multiplied by 3. 
 
                                                 
23 A 1993 survey conducted for the Group of 30 (1994) by Price Waterhouse found that, among 80 
responding derivatives dealers, 30% were using VaR to support market risk limits. Another 10% planned to 
do so.  The alternative building-block measure—which was now called the “standardized” 
measure—was changed modestly from the 1993 proposal. Risk weightings remained 
unchanged, so it may reasonably be interpreted as still reflecting a 10-day 95% VaR 
metric. Extra capital charges were added in an attempt to recognize non-linear exposures. 
 
The Basle Committee’s new proposal was incorporated into an amendment to the 1988 
accord, which was adopted in 1996. It went into effect in 1998. 
 
The Name “Value-at-Risk” 
Origins of the name “value-at-risk” are murky. Several similar names were used during 
the 1990’s, including: “dollars-at-risk” (DaR), “capital-at-risk” (CaR), “income-at-risk” 
(IaR), “earnings-at-risk” (EaR) and “value-at-risk” (VaR). It seemed that users liked the 
“-at-risk” moniker, but were uncomfortable labeling exactly what was “at risk”. The 
“dollars” label of DaR was too provincial for use in many countries. The “capital” label 
of CaR seemed too application-specific. Some applications of VaR—such as VaR 
limits—were unrelated to capital. The “income” and “earnings” labels of IaR and EaR 
had accounting connotations unrelated to market risk. Software vendor Wall Street 
Systems went so far as to call its software “money-at-risk”. It is perhaps the vagueness of 
the label “value” that made “value-at-risk” attractive. Also, its use in the RiskMetrics 
Technical Document added to its appeal. By 1996, other names were falling out of use.   
 
Guldimann (2000) suggests that the name “value-at-risk” originated within JP Morgan 
prior to 1985: 
 
… we learned that “fully hedged” in a bank with fully matched funding can have 
two meanings. We could either invest the Bank’s net equity in long bonds and 
generate stable interest earnings, or we could invest it in Fed funds and keep the 
market value constant. We decided to focus on value and assume a target 
duration investors assigned to the bank’s equity. Thus value-at-risk was born.  
 
It seems likely that the “DaR” and “CaR” names also arose during the 1980’s, since use 
of both was common by the early 1990’s. “DaR” appears
24 in the financial literature as 
early as June 1991—two years prior to the first known appearance of “VaR” in the July 
1993 G-30 Report. “CaR” appears as early as September 1992.
25 
 
The VaR Debate 
Following the release of RiskMetrics and the widespread adoption of VaR measures, 
there was somewhat of a backlash against VaR. This has come to be called the “VaR 
debate”. Criticisms followed three themes: 
 
1. that different VaR implementations produced inconsistent results; 
                                                 
24 Mark (1991). 
25 Wilson (1992). 2. that, as a measure of risk, VaR is conceptually flawed; 
3. that widespread use of VaR entails systemic risks. 
 
Critics in the first camp include Beder (1995) and Marshall and Seigel (1997). Beder 
performed an analysis using Monte Carlo and historical VaR measures to calculate 
sixteen different VaR measurements for each of three portfolios. The sixteen 
measurements for each portfolio tended to be inconsistent, leading Beder to describe VaR 
as “seductive but dangerous.” In retrospect, this indictment seems harsh. Beder’s analysis 
employed different VaR metrics,
26 different covariance matrices and historical VaR 
measures with very low sample sizes. It comes as no surprise that she obtained disparate 
VaR measurements! Despite its shortcomings, Beder’s paper is historically important as 
an early critique of VaR. It was cited frequently in the ensuing VaR debate. 
 
Marshall and Siegel (1997) approached eleven software vendors that had all implemented 
the RiskMetrics linear VaR measure. They provided each with several portfolios and a 
covariance matrix and asked them to calculate the portfolios’ one-day 95% VaR. In this 
way, each vendor would be calculating VaR for the same portfolios using the same 
covariance matrix based upon the same VaR measure and the same VaR metric. The 
vendors should have obtained identical results, but they did not. Marshall and Siegel’s 





of Vendors’ VaR 
Measurements 
Foreign exchange forwards  1% 
Money market deposits  9% 
Forward rate agreements  10% 
Bonds  17% 
Interest rate swaps  21% 
 
Table 1: Marshall and Siegel’s (1997) results are summarized with a standard deviation of vendors’ VaR 
measurements for each portfolio. Standard deviations are calculated as: standard deviation of VaR measurements 
divided by median of VaR measurements. Most vendors provided results for only certain portfolios, so standard 
deviations are each based on six to eight VaR measurements. A single outlier skewed the standard deviation for the 
money market portfolio. 
 
The implementation issues that Marshall and Siegel highlighted were—and still are—an 
important concern. However, such issues arise with any quantitative software, and can be 
addressed with suitable validation and verification procedures.  
 
Of more concern were criticisms suggesting that VaR measures were conceptually 
flawed. One such critic was Taleb (1997): 
 
The condensation of complex factors naturally does not just affect the accuracy of 
the measure. Critics of VaR (including the author) argue that simplification could 
result in such distortions as to nullify the value of the measurement. Furthermore, 
it can lead to charlatanism: Lulling an innocent investor or business manager into 
                                                 
26 She employed one-day 95%, one-day 99%, two-week 95% and two-week 99% VaR metrics, applying 
each in one quarter of her VaR measurements. This was the largest contributor to the dispersion in her 
results. a false sense of security could be a serious breach of faith. Operators are dealing 
with unstable parameters, unlike those of the physical sciences, and risk 
measurement should not just be understood to be a vague and imprecise estimate. 
This approach can easily lead to distortions. The most nefarious effect of the VaR 
is that it has allowed people who have never had any exposure to market risks to 
express their opinion on the matter. 
 
Some criticism of VaR seems to have stemmed from traders resistant to independent 
oversight of their risk taking activities. Taleb’s closing remark seems to play to that 
audience. As founder and head of risk management software vendor Algorithmics, 
Dembo (1998) speaks more to risk managers: 
 
Value-at-risk, per se, is a good idea. But the way it’s measured today, VaR is bad 
news because the calculation errors can be enormous. Often, the number that is 
computed is almost meaningless. In other words, the number has a large standard 
error … 
 
I also find a real problem with the idea that one can forecast a correlation matrix. 
If you try and forecast the correlation matrix, you’ve got a point estimate in the 
future. The errors that we’ve seen, resulting from correlation effects, dominate the 
errors in market movements at the time. So the correlation methodology for VaR 
is inherently flawed. 
 
Such concerns have a practical tone, but underlying them are philosophical issues first 
identified by Markowitz (1952, 1959). If probabilities are subjective, it makes no sense to 
speak of the “accuracy” of a VaR measure or of a “forecast” of a correlation matrix. 
From a subjective perspective, a VaR measurement or a correlation matrix is merely an 
objective representation of a user’s subjective perceptions. 
 
The third line of criticism suggests that, if many market participants use VaR to allocate 
capital or maintain market risk limits, they will have a tendency to simultaneously 
liquidate positions during periods of market turmoil. Bob Litzenberger of Goldman Sach 
comments: 
 
Consider a situation when volatilities rise and there are some trading losses. 
VaR’s would be higher and tolerances for risk would likely be lower. For an 
individual firm, it would appear reasonable to reduce trading positions; however, 




This risk is similar to that of portfolio insurance, which contributed to the stock market 
crash of 1987, but there are differences. Stock positions tend mostly to be long because 
short selling comprises only a small fraction of equity transactions. Portfolio insurance 
programs in 1987 were designed to protect against a falling market, so they responded to 
the crash in lockstep. In other markets, positions may be long or short. In fixed income 
                                                 
27 Quoted in Dunbar (2000), p. 203. markets, there are lenders and borrowers. In commodities markets, there are buyers and 
sellers. In foreign exchange markets, every forward position is long one currency but 
short another. If VaR measures compel speculators in these markets to reduce positions, 
this will affect both long and short positions, so liquidations will tend to offset.   
 
Conclusion 
VaR has its origins in portfolio theory and capital requirements. The latter can be traced 
to NYSE capital requirements of the early 20
th century. During the 1950’s, portfolio 
theorists developed basic mathematics for VaR measures. During the 1970’s, US 
regulators prompted securities firms to develop procedures for aggregating data to 
support capital calculations reported in their FOCUS reports.  
 
By the 1980’s, a need for institutions to develop more sophisticated VaR measures had 
arisen. Markets were becoming more volatile, and sources of market risk were 
proliferating. By that time, the resources necessary to calculate VaR were also becoming 
available. Processing power was inexpensive, and data vendors were starting to make 
large quantities of historical price data available. Financial institutions implemented 
sophisticated proprietary VaR measures during the 1980’s, but these remained practical 
tools known primarily to professionals within those institutions.  
 
During the early 1990’s, concerns about the proliferation of derivative instruments and 
publicized losses spurred the field of financial risk management. JP Morgan publicized 
VaR to professionals at financial institutions and corporations with its RiskMetrics 
service. Ultimately, the value of proprietary VaR measures was recognized by the Basle 
Committee, which authorized their use by banks for performing regulatory capital 
calculations. An ensuing “VaR debate” raised issues related to the subjectivity of risk, 
which Markowitz had first identified in 1952. Time will tell if widespread use of VaR 
contributes to the risks VaR is intended to measure. 
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